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  In 2000, for the first time in over a century, a presidential candidate captured the White House despite losing the 
nationwide popular vote.  Not surprisingly, the extraordinary 2000 presidential election renewed a long- standing 
debate regarding the Electoral College system of selecting America's Presidents.  David W. Abbot and James R. 
Levine have described the Electoral College as "curiously out of step with . . . democratic developments, a relic of a 
bygone age when it was thought proper to limit the role of the people." [FN1]  An earlier American Bar Association 
report called it "archaic, undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous." [FN2]  On the other hand, 
Electoral College supporters, like Senator Byron Dorgan, are equally convinced of the College's merits: "Born in 
compromise, the system accommodates the tensions that otherwise could cause chronic conflict.  It gives voice to 
regional concerns . . . and it amplifies the impact of minorities on the big stage of presidential politics.  The nation is 
the better for it." [FN3] 
 
  This Comment inquires into whether America should retain the Electoral College to select its Presidents.  It first 
discusses the College historically, beginning with the circumstances and debates surrounding its creation in 
Philadelphia in 1787.  It then examines the four elections in which a President assumed office *718 without winning 
the popular vote.  Next, it considers the merits of several proposals to reform the College, analyzing three modern 
elections where slight vote shifts would have deprived the popular vote winner of the Presidency.  Finally, this 
Comment urges replacement of the Electoral College system with direct presidential election. 
 
 
I 
 
The Origins of the Electoral College 
 
A. The Articles of Confederation 
 
  Following the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the American colonists quickly realized that 
some form of common government was necessary to fight the impending war for independence against Great 
Britain. To address this need, delegates at the June 1776 Continental Congress voted to adopt the Articles of 
Confederation. [FN4]  The Articles established a weak system of national government, in which each state remained 
largely sovereign. The national legislature consisted of a single house, with each state having a single vote.  The 
chief executive, whose main duty was to preside over the legislature, had no real power. 
 
  The Articles also failed to provide means to enforce legislation passed by Congress and, as a result, the young 
nation teetered on the verge of bankruptcy as the states routinely failed to pay taxes to the national government. 
[FN5]  Amending the Articles required unanimous approval of the states, making any changes virtually impossible. 
[FN6]  To deal with these problems, several nationalist leaders, including Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, 
drafted an address to the states urging them to send delegates to Philadelphia to revise and strengthen the national 
government. [FN7] 
 
 
B. The Constitutional Convention 
 
  The Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787, and the *719 delegates first focused their attention on the 
 composition of the national legislature. [FN8]  Delegates from populous states advocated a scheme known as the 
Virginia Plan, which based legislative representation on each state's population. [FN9]  In contrast, small-state 
delegates urged adoption of the New Jersey Plan, where each state received one vote in a unicameral legislature. 
[FN10]  In response to this conflict, Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman devised the Connecticut Compromise.  
Sherman's plan provided for a bicameral system, with one house based on popular representation and the other 
predicated on equal representation for each state. [FN11]  The Convention eventually approved the Compromise on 
July 16. [FN12]  Later, on July 23, the delegates voted to allow each state two senators, with each senator voting 
individually. [FN13] 
 
  With the contentious issues surrounding the national legislature settled, the delegates turned their attention to the 
selection method and power of the national executive.  Earlier, on July 17, the delegates had agreed that the 
executive should consist of a single person. [FN14]  Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania argued that an executive 
chosen by Congress "will be the mere creature of the legislature if appointed and impeachable by that body [and] 
real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment." [FN15]  In contrast, Sherman maintained that the "sense of the 
nation would be better expressed by the legislature, than by the people at large." [FN16]  The people would "never 
be sufficiently informed of characters [to select the executive properly and would] never give a majority of votes to 
any one man." [FN17]  Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson responded by suggesting that in the event no candidate 
received an electoral majority, the national legislature could then select an executive from among the several 
candidates. [FN18] Wilson pointed out that Massachusetts successfully employed *720 a similar method in 
gubernatorial elections. [FN19]  According to Wilson, such a system "would restrain the choice to a good 
nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue and cabal." [FN20]  Despite spirited arguments by Wilson 
and Morris, the Convention rejected popular election of the executive by a vote of nine to one. [FN21] 
 
  On August 6, the Convention's Committee of Detail, charged with drafting the actual wording of the Constitution, 
reported the following proposed language regarding the executive:  
    The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person.  His stile shall be, "The President of 
the United States of America;"  and his title shall be, "His Excellency."  He shall be elected by ballot by the 
Legislature.  He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time. [FN22] 
 
  The delegates began debating this provision on August 24.  South Carolina delegate John Rutledge immediately 
suggested that both houses of the legislature elect the executive, with each member having a single vote. [FN23]  
Delegates from small states, like Sherman and Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, objected on grounds that large states 
would undoubtedly control the selection process. [FN24]  The Convention delegates ultimately adopted Rutledge's 
amendment by a vote of seven to four. [FN25] 
 
  At this point, Morris moved for election of the executive "by electors to be chosen by the people of the several 
states." [FN26] The motion failed by a vote of six to five, suggesting that a significant number of delegates remained 
in favor of popular election of the executive. [FN27]  But the delegates were unable to agree on the length of the 
executive's term and whether he would be eligible for reelection. [FN28]  On August 31, the Convention referred 
these and other undecided items to a special committee composed of one delegate from each state. [FN29] 
 
 
*721 C. The Electoral College is Born 
 
  The special committee's final recommendations, reported to the Convention on September 4, bore the modern-day 
Electoral College.  Both the President and Vice President would serve four-year terms and be eligible for reelection. 
[FN30]  This method reflected a compromise between more populous and smaller states.  Each state would select "a 
number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and members of the House of Representatives to which 
the state may be entitled in the legislature." [FN31]  The state legislatures had the freedom to choose electors in any 
manner they wished. [FN32] Electors would cast votes for two candidates, one of whom was required to be from a 
different state than the elector. [FN33]  The candidate receiving the most votes, if the sum constituted a majority of 
the total number of electors, would become President. [FN34]  If no candidate garnered a majority, the Senate would 
choose the President from among the five candidates receiving the most popular votes. [FN35]  The candidate with 
the second-highest number of votes would become Vice President. [FN36] 
 
  For three full days, the Convention debated the committee's proposal.  Some delegates believed that the system 
 would encourage a large number of candidates and prevent a single candidate from receiving a majority of electoral 
votes. [FN37]  Virginia delegate George Mason speculated that the Senate would select the President "nineteen 
times in twenty." [FN38]  Abraham Baldwin of Georgia disagreed, saying that the "increasing intercourse among the 
people of the [s]tates" would lead to better-known candidates who were likely to obtain electoral vote majorities. 
[FN39]  Other delegates, like Pinckney, worried that the executive would be too dependent on the aristocratic 
Senate, which also had the power to *722 remove the President by impeachment. [FN40] 
 
  On September 6, Sherman offered a final compromise.  In case of a tie or the failure of a candidate to obtain an 
electoral vote majority, the House of Representatives, rather than the Senate, would choose the President. [FN41]  
Selection of the Vice President under such circumstances would remain in the Senate.  To give smaller states a voice 
in presidential selection, Sherman proposed that each state's delegation in the House, regardless of size, receive one 
vote. [FN42]  The Convention, with little debate, approved this proposal by an overwhelming margin. [FN43] 
 
  Commentators advance several reasons why the Convention endorsed Sherman's proposal so readily.  First, after 
four months in Philadelphia, delegates were undoubtedly anxious to complete their work and return home.  Second, 
no immediate threat existed because the nation expected George Washington to serve as President indefinitely.  
Finally, the delegates also were under pressure to approve the new Constitution and begin the ratification process.  
According to Neal R. Peirce and Lawrence D. Longley, "[t]he most basic reason for the invention of the electoral 
college was that the convention was deadlocked on simpler schemes like direct election and choice by Congress.  It 
devised a system that could be 'sold' in the immediate context of 1787." [FN44] Others suggest that the system 
resulted from the framers' recognition that the country suffered from limited means of communication and a low 
level of literacy, making it difficult for citizens to avoid deception in elections. [FN45]  Uninformed citizens would 
likely favor candidates from their own states, resulting in a significant *723 advantage for candidates from the larger 
states. [FN46]  The framers assumed "that the electors, to whom the people would delegate their franchise, would be 
the wise men of the community" and therefore able to make an informed and disinterested choice. [FN47] 
 
  Following approval of Sherman's compromise, the bulk of the delegates' work was complete.  They appointed a 
committee to combine the various resolutions passed into a single, uniform document. [FN48]  The state delegations 
unanimously approved the new Constitution on September 15. [FN49]  Two days later, the delegates signed the 
document, and the Convention adjourned. [FN50]  The delegates then faced the difficult task of convincing nine of 
the thirteen states to ratify the Constitution. [FN51] 
 
 
D. The Ratification Debate 
 
  The issues surrounding selection of the national executive received relatively little attention during the ratification 
debates. [FN52] Alexander Hamilton noted that the process for selecting the executive was "the only part of the 
system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of 
approbation." [FN53] According to Hamilton, "if the manner of [selecting the executive] be not perfect, it is at least 
excellent." [FN54]  Hamilton also argued that the process established by the framers "affords a moral certainty that 
the office of *724 President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the 
requisite qualifications." [FN55]  James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that "[t]he manner of 
appointing the president of the United States, I find is not objected to . . . .  I flatter myself the experiment will be a 
happy one for our country." [FN56]  By June 1788, the required nine state legislatures ratified the Constitution. 
[FN57]  Electors met in the various state capitals on February 4, 1789, and unanimously elected Washington 
President with sixty-nine electoral votes. [FN58]  John Adams received thirty-four electoral votes and became Vice 
President. [FN59] 
 
 
II 
 
Early Presidential Elections 
 
  Following Washington's decision to forego a third term, the nation witnessed for the first time a competitive race 
between two candidates. Simultaneously, a potential pitfall of the presidential election process began to emerge.  In 
the event each elector cast votes for the party's candidate for President and Vice President, the resulting tie would 
 throw the election into the House of Representatives.  Furthermore, if electors withheld votes from a vice 
presidential candidate, the losing party's candidate for President could possibly obtain the second-highest number of 
electoral votes and become Vice President. 
 
 
A. The Election of 1796 
 
  The presidential election of 1796 produced such a scenario. Federalist members of Congress nominated Adams for 
President and Thomas Pinckney for Vice President.  Republicans selected Thomas Jefferson for President and Aaron 
Burr as Vice President.  To prevent a tie between Adams and Pinckney and the resulting election in the House of 
Representatives, Federalist electors in several states withheld votes from Pinckney. [FN60]  With 138 electors 
casting votes, Adams received seventy-one electoral *725 votes, and Pinckney fifty-nine. [FN61]  Sixty-eight 
electors cast their votes for Jefferson, giving him the second-highest electoral vote total. [FN62]  The result was a 
Republican Vice President, Jefferson, in Adams's Federalist administration. 
 
 
B. The Election of 1800 
 
  Similar problems arose in the election of 1800.  Adams stood for reelection with Charles Pinckney, the brother of 
his previous running mate.  Republicans again chose Jefferson as the party's presidential candidate and Burr for Vice 
President.  Electors cast seventy-three votes for Jefferson, compared to sixty- five for Adams. [FN63]  Republican 
electors failed to withhold any votes from Burr, however, causing both candidates to receive seventy-three electoral 
votes. [FN64]  Burr refused to step aside for Jefferson, and the election was thrown into the House of 
Representatives. [FN65] 
 
  On February 11, 1801, the 106 members of the House, fifty-eight Federalists and forty-eight Republicans, 
convened to break the deadlock. [FN66]  On the first ballot, Burr received fifty-three votes to Jefferson's fifty-one. 
[FN67]  The Constitution provided that each of the sixteen state delegations had a single vote, with a majority of 
nine votes needed to secure election. [FN68]  Eight states voted for Jefferson and six for Burr, with Vermont and 
Maryland evenly divided. [FN69]  Despite twenty-seven separate ballots during this first session, the deadlock 
remained. [FN70]  A number of political maneuvers by both sides followed, including strong efforts by Alexander 
Hamilton to thwart Burr's election. [FN71]  On February 17, after thirty-six ballots, the House elected Jefferson 
President by a vote of ten states to four. [FN72] 
 
 
*726 III 
 
The Twelfth Amendment 
 
  The presidential elections of 1796 and 1800 "demonstrated both the impracticality and the dangers in the 
Constitution's requirement that each presidential elector cast two equal, undifferentiated votes for President." [FN73]  
Moreover, the possibility remained that a losing party might switch votes to the opposing party's vice presidential 
candidate and elect him President.  At the urging of several state legislatures, the House of Representatives, on May 
1, 1802, approved the "designation" amendment, a constitutional amendment requiring electors to cast separate 
votes for President and Vice President. [FN74]  The Senate failed, however, by a single vote to garner the two-thirds 
vote needed for approval. [FN75] Gouverneur Morris expressed fear that separate votes for President and Vice 
President would result in persons of lower stature obtaining the Vice Presidency. [FN76]  Residents of smaller states 
also opposed the proposed change.  They feared that separate voting for President and Vice President would lessen 
the chances of an election being decided in the House, where each state had one vote regardless of size. [FN77]  
Federalists argued in favor of casting two votes for President, mainly because they hoped their presidential candidate 
in 1804 would at least capture the Vice Presidency. [FN78] 
 
  To prevent a repeat of the Jefferson-Burr crisis of 1801, the House of Representatives renewed consideration of the 
designation amendment.  Following extensive debate, the House approved the measure by the requisite majority of 
eighty-eight to thirty-nine on October 28, 1803. [FN79]  On December 2, 1803, the Senate approved its own 
amendment requiring separate voting for President and Vice President by a vote of twenty-two to ten. [FN80]  The 
 Senate amendment provided that the House would select *727 from the top three candidates in a contingency 
election, rather than the five specified in the House legislation. [FN81]  On December 8, 1803, the House concurred 
with the Senate amendment, sending the Twelfth Amendment to the states for ratification. [FN82]  By September 
1804, the required number of states ratified the amendment, and it remains almost entirely in effect today. [FN83] 
 
  The most significant change contained in the Twelfth Amendment was the requirement that electors cast separate 
votes for President and Vice President. [FN84]  This condition remedied the two dangers that emerged in 1796 and 
1800.  It extinguished the possibility of an electoral vote tie between presidential and vice presidential candidates, 
and made the election of a President and Vice President from opposing parties nearly impossible.  To prevent 
electors from favoring candidates from their own states, the amendment also required at least one of each elector's 
two votes to be for a candidate who was not an inhabitant of the elector's state. [FN85]  The provisions of the 
Twelfth Amendment unquestionably *728 cured several major flaws of the framers' electoral system.  New issues, 
however, emerged in the presidential selection process as the country grew in population, nationalist sentiment 
increased among the citizenry, and many states turned to direct popular elections.  Chief among these issues was the 
possibility that a candidate who lost the national popular vote could nevertheless become President. 
 
 
IV 
 
Electoral Vote Winners, Popular Vote Losers 
 
A. The Elections of 1824, 1876, and 1888 
 
  Before the election of 2000, only three Presidents took office without winning the popular vote: John Quincy 
Adams in 1824, Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876, and Benjamin Harrison in 1888. [FN86]  In 1824, Adams, Andrew 
Jackson, Speaker of the House Henry Clay, and Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford sought the 
Presidency. [FN87]  For the first time in history, a majority of the twenty-four states conducted direct popular 
elections. [FN88]  Jackson emerged as the clear popular vote winner with 152,933 votes, compared to 115,696 for 
Adams. [FN89]  Despite Jackson's popular vote victory, he failed to obtain a majority of the electoral votes cast. 
[FN90] In the ensuing election in the House of Representatives, Clay threw his support to Adams, who prevailed on 
the first ballot. [FN91] 
 
  *729 Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, the governor of Ohio, won the 1876 presidential election after intense, and 
most likely fraudulent, dealing.  New York Governor Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic nominee, won the popular 
vote by more than 250,000 votes. [FN92]  Republican operatives quickly realized that if Hayes could overturn 
Tilden's apparent victories in South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, he would defeat Tilden by a single electoral 
vote. [FN93] Using a variety of corrupt tactics, Republicans went to work on changing the outcome in these three 
states. [FN94]  Ultimately, several states submitted two sets of returns, and Congress established a special electoral 
commission to settle the dispute. [FN95]  Following numerous unsavory activities by both parties, the commission 
sided with Hayes in each dispute and Congress eventually certified his election. [FN96] 
 
  The election of 1888 marked, until 2000, the last time a popular vote loser gained the Presidency.  Republicans 
nominated Benjamin Harrison of Indiana to challege the Democratic incumbent, President Grover Cleveland.  
Following an unexciting campaign that focused mainly on tariff issues, Cleveland won the popular vote by nearly 
100,000 votes. [FN97]  But Harrison edged Cleveland in New York by a mere 13,373 votes and gained the state's 
all-important thirty- six electoral votes, which were enough to deny Cleveland a consecutive second term. [FN98] 
 
 
B. The Election of 2000 
 
  The 2000 presidential election between Al Gore and George W. Bush saw a popular vote loser capture the 
Presidency for only the fourth time in history. As early returns filtered in, Gore emerged as the clear winner of the 
popular vote. [FN99]  Gore's popular vote margin, however, was due largely to substantial victories *730 in New 
York and California. [FN100]  Not surprisingly, Bush emerged victorious in Texas, carried the South, and secured 
an important Midwest victory in Ohio.  Throughout election night, as Bush and Gore exchanged victories in 
different states, neither candidate emerged with a commanding electoral vote lead.  With the election in a dead heat, 
 all eyes eventually turned to Florida and its twenty-five electoral votes.  It soon became evident that the candidate 
who carried the state of Florida would have a majority of electoral votes and obtain the Presidency. 
 
  The first complete returns showed Bush winning Florida by a margin of 1,784 votes, giving him 271 electoral 
votes, one more than the 270 needed for victory. [FN101]  Florida law provides for an automatic statewide recount 
in elections where a victor's margin is one-half of one percent or less. [FN102]  The resulting recount trimmed 
Bush's lead to only 327 votes. [FN103]  Gore then sought hand recounts in several Democratic-leaning counties, and 
the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the counties complete hand recounts by November 26, nearly three weeks 
after election day. [FN104]  The court also ordered that the amended tallies be included in the state's official total. 
[FN105]  Two counties, Palm Beach and Miami-Dade, failed to complete recounts by the deadline, *731 and Florida 
Secretary of State Katherine Harris certified Bush as the winner by a margin of 537 votes on November 26. [FN106]  
On December 8, after numerous legal challenges by both candidates, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a 
continuation of the Palm Beach and Miami- Dade hand recounts. [FN107]  The following day, the United States 
Supreme Court stayed the recounts and agreed to review the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. [FN108]  On 
December 12, the Supreme Court declined by a vote of five to four to overturn Florida's certification and 
discontinued the recounts. [FN109]  Like Richard Nixon forty years earlier, Gore had the unhappy task of presiding 
over a joint session of Congress that certified the election of his presidential opponent. [FN110] 
 
 
V 
 
Proposals for Reform 
 
  Following the 2000 presidential election, a number of alternatives, both old and new, emerged as potential 
replacements for the Electoral College. [FN111]  This Comment next considers four proposals to reform the 
Electoral College system: direct popular election, the district plan, the bonus plan, and the proportional plan. 
 
 
A. Direct Popular Election 
 
  The most common reform proposal advanced by Electoral College opponents is direct popular election.  Senator 
Dick Durbin describes the Electoral College as  
    undemocratic and unfair.  It distorts the election process, with some votes by design having more weight than 
others.  Imagine for a moment if you were told as follows: We want you to *732 vote for President.  We are going to 
give you one vote in selection of the President, but a neighbor of yours is going to have three votes in selecting the 
President.  You would say that is not American, that is fundamentally unfair. We live in a nation that is one person--
one citizen, one vote.  But that is exactly what the electoral college does. [FN112] 
 
  Durbin, along with Representative Ray LaHood, advocates a plan that provides for election of the President by 
popular vote, with the proviso that a single candidate must receive at least forty percent of the total popular votes 
cast. [FN113]  If no candidate obtains forty percent in the general election, the two candidates receiving the highest 
number of popular votes participate in a runoff election.  Other notable figures, including Senator Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, also voiced support for direct popular vote.  Shortly after her election to the Senate in November 2000, 
Clinton called the Electoral College "an anachronism" and stated her intention to sponsor legislation requiring 
popular election of the President. [FN114]  In the three months following the 2000 election, members of Congress 
introduced five measures to abolish the Electoral College in favor of direct popular election. [FN115] 
 
  *733 The obvious benefit of a direct election system, because ascension to the Presidency by a loser of the popular 
vote is impossible, is that direct election eliminates questions surrounding the legitimacy of a President who loses 
the popular vote but prevails in the Electoral College.  Criticisms of direct election proposals generally focus on 
federalism concerns. [FN116] Electoral College proponents argue that the framers intended to establish a system 
under which neither large states nor a particular region dominated presidential elections.  By providing three 
electoral votes to each state regardless of size, proponents maintain that the framers intended small states to be able 
to tip the balance in a close election, thereby forcing the candidates to address regional concerns and campaign in 
less-populated areas. Critics of direct popular election also cite the possibility of a nationwide recount as another 
serious drawback. 
  
 
B. District Plan 
 
  Another reform proposal receiving significant attention is the district plan.  Under the district plan, the presidential 
candidate who receives the most votes in a particular congressional district wins that district's single electoral vote.  
The candidate who receives the highest total of votes statewide receives two at-large votes, representing each state's 
number of senators.  First advocated in 1800 by Representative John Nicholas, several states, especially in early 
presidential elections, have utilized the district plan. [FN117]  For many years, the district plan's champion was 
Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota, who actually gained Senate approval for a modified version of the district plan 
in 1956. [FN118]  Currently, only Maine and Nebraska utilize the district plan. [FN119] 
 
  *734 At first glance, the district plan appears to strike an agreeable balance between federalism concerns and 
majority rule. The district plan fails, however, to address the problem of a popular vote loser gaining the Presidency.  
For instance, if the 2000 election were decided under the district plan, Bush's total number of electoral votes would 
have increased to 288 from 271, giving him a significantly greater electoral vote margin of victory despite the fact 
that he lost the popular vote by more than 500,000 votes. [FN120]  Similarly, the district plan would have resulted in 
an electoral vote tie between Ford and Carter in 1976, even though Carter defeated Ford by more than 1.7 million 
popular votes. [FN121]  In 1960, the district plan would have dramatically changed the electoral vote outcome and 
put Nixon in the Oval Office with 280 electoral votes, compared to 252 for Kennedy. [FN122] As noted in Part 
VI.A.1 below, the Alabama totals and fraud allegations make it virtually impossible to tell who actually won the 
1960 popular vote.  It is safe to say, however, that using the district plan in 1960 could have easily made the popular 
vote loser President.  Thus, in the eleven most recent presidential elections, the district plan would have awarded the 
Presidency--on three different occasions--to a candidate who lost the popular vote. 
 
 
C. Bonus Plan 
 
  The bonus plan, although retaining the main characteristics of the Electoral College, calls for the winner of the 
nationwide popular vote to receive a bonus two electoral votes for each state and the District of Columbia, resulting 
in a bonus of 102 electoral *735 votes.  According to historian Arthur Schlesinger, a member of the committee 
formulating the plan and a former advisor to President Kennedy, the "bonus plan would balance the existing federal 
bonus--the two electoral votes conferred by the Constitution on each state--and would preserve both the 
constitutional and practical role of the states in the presidential election process." [FN123]  Indeed, the bonus plan 
would have elected the popular vote winner as President in every election. [FN124]  Schlesinger argues that the 
bonus plan would encourage "parties to maximize their vote in states they have no hope of winning, would stimulate 
[voter] turnout, reinvigorate state parties, enhance voter equality and contribute to the vitality of federalism." 
[FN125] 
 
  The most persistent drawback of direct election, namely the prospect of a nationwide recount, would also be 
present under the bonus plan.  In a close popular election, the 102-vote bonus would almost always be greater than 
the margin between two candidates.  For instance, Nixon ultimately lost the 1960 election by eighty-four electoral 
votes, eighteen less than the bonus amount of 102.  The possibilities of numerous recounts and legal battles still 
remain under the bonus plan.  According to Schlesinger, electing a President who loses the popular vote results "in 
an intolerable predicament.  It is intolerable because it is undemocratic. And it is intolerable because it imposes a 
fatal burden on the minority President." [FN126]  If the goal of the bonus plan is to ensure that the winner of the 
popular vote becomes President, direct election appears to be a more sensible alternative to the artificial nature of 
the bonus plan. 
 
 
D. Proportional Plan 
 
  The concept underlying the proportional system is simple: electoral votes are awarded in the same proportion as a 
state's popular vote.  Similar to the district system, the proportional plan perpetuates the concept of federalism by 
preserving the state-by-state allocation of electoral votes.  Further, because the *736 plan allocates a state's electoral 
votes on the basis of its popular vote percentages, individual electors are abolished. 
  
  Advocates of the proportional plan argue that the system lessens the likelihood of electing the loser of the national 
popular vote.  But analyses of past elections suggest otherwise. Under the proportional system, the presidential 
popular vote loser would have been elected President in 1880, 1896, 1960, and 2000. [FN127]  Since the 
proportional plan also incorporates some of the characteristics of the direct popular election, the proportional plan 
also potentially weakens the two major parties, encourages faction, and increases the chance of a nationwide recount 
in close elections.  Therefore, the proportional system appears to possess the two least desirable characteristics of 
both direct popular election and the Electoral College system, namely the possibility of a nationwide recount and 
election of a popular vote loser. 
 
 
VI 
 
The Case for Direct Election 
 
A. Modern Near Misses 
 
  One argument commonly advanced in support of the Electoral College is that popular vote losers rarely assume the 
Presidency. For instance, Senator Peter Fitzgerald argues that "[t]he occasional difference between the electoral and 
popular vote tallies is a small price to pay for a system that helps preserve national unity and gives small groups 
significant voices and protections in our presidential contests." [FN128]  Indeed, prior to 2000, the last time a 
popular vote loser prevailed in a presidential election was in 1888.  But the threat of such an occurrence is more than 
just an occasional one.  A close examination of the ten elections prior to 2000 reveals three separate incidents in 
which a popular vote winner nearly failed to obtain an electoral vote majority. 
 
 
1. The Election of 1960 
 
  The 1960 presidential election between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon resulted in one of the closest 
popular vote contests in history.  Kennedy received 34,220,984 votes compared *737 to 34,108,157 for Nixon, a 
margin of less than 0.2%. [FN129]  Despite his narrow popular vote victory, Kennedy emerged as the clear electoral 
vote winner with 303 electoral votes to Nixon's 219. [FN130]  Senator Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia received fifteen 
electoral votes, primarily from unpledged Democratic electors in Mississippi and Alabama. [FN131] 
 
  Kennedy's actual popular vote margin was most likely even smaller.  Alabama law provided that the names of each 
party's individual electors appear on the ballot, and each party's slate of electors contained eleven names, the total 
number of Alabama's electoral votes. [FN132]  All Republican electors were pledged to Nixon, and the highest 
Republican elector received 237,981 votes. This figure provides an unambiguous popular vote total for Nixon in 
Alabama. [FN133]  Prior to the general election, Alabama Democrats held a primary to determine which electors 
would appear on the November ballot.  The result was six unpledged elector candidates, along with five candidates 
pledged to support the eventual Democratic nominee, who was ultimately Kennedy. [FN134]  In the general 
election, the highest unpledged Democratic elector received 324,050 votes, compared to 318,303 for the highest 
Kennedy elector. [FN135]  These 318,303 votes were included in Kennedy's popular vote total, giving him a 
nationwide margin of 112,827 votes.  This result is misleading because it effectively counts the votes of Alabama's 
Democratic voters twice, once for Kennedy and once for the unpledged elector slate. 
 
  A method developed by Congressional Quarterly provides a more accurate method of tallying the Alabama popular 
vote.  This method starts with the highest number of votes received by a Democratic elector in Alabama, 324,050, 
and divides it proportionally between unpledged electors, who constituted six- elevenths of the total electors, and 
Kennedy electors, who made up the remaining five-elevenths. [FN136]  The result avoids a double-count of 
Democratic votes and provides a remarkable outcome.  Instead *738 of the 318,303 votes included in his official 
Alabama total, Kennedy would have received only 147,295.  In turn, this would have resulted in a Nixon national 
popular vote lead of 51,181 votes. [FN137]  Regardless of the Alabama popular vote tally, Kennedy still held a 
substantial lead in the Electoral College. 
 
  In addition to the confusion regarding the popular vote in Alabama, claims of voting irregularities in other states 
 began to surface.  Kennedy carried Illinois by only 8,858 votes, and Republicans speculated that Nixon could 
reverse the Illinois outcome on fraud grounds and win the state's twenty- seven electoral votes. [FN138]  Without 
Illinois, Kennedy's electoral vote total would have been reduced to 273, and some believed that four Southern 
electors might desert Kennedy and throw the election into the House of Representatives. [FN139]  Despite strong 
evidence of fraud in both Illinois and Texas, Nixon declined to pursue any vote recounts. [FN140]  Even without 
recounts, several relatively minor vote shifts would have affected the electoral vote outcome in 1960.  Shifts of 
4,480 votes in Illinois and 4,491 in Missouri would have deprived Kennedy of an electoral vote majority and thrown 
the election into the House of Representatives. [FN141]  Additional shifts of fifty-eight votes in Hawaii, 1,247 in 
Nevada, and 1,148 in New Mexico would have given Nixon an electoral vote majority and the Presidency. [FN142] 
 
  The 1960 election illustrates several key shortcomings of the Electoral College system.  As evidenced by 
Kennedy's thin margin in Illinois and the fraud allegations, the election demonstrates the potential impact of fraud in 
the Electoral College's winner-take-all system.  The election of 1960 also showed that a third-party candidate, with 
little national support, can deprive a candidate of an Electoral College majority.  Also, the potential for a *739 
faithless elector to affect the outcome increases dramatically in a close election.  Lastly, considering the results in 
Illinois and Missouri, the election proves that very minor shifts in the popular vote change the result in the Electoral 
College.  Peirce and Longley also note that, in light of Alabama's electoral system in 1960, accurate national popular 
vote totals will be difficult to calculate if states are permitted to choose electors in any manner they wish. [FN143] 
 
 
2. The Election of 1968 
 
  Following his 1960 presidential defeat and failed California gubernatorial candidacy in 1962, Richard Nixon 
reemerged as the Republican nominee for President in 1968.  Nixon's opponent was Vice President Hubert H. 
Humphrey, who became the Democratic frontrunner after the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. For the 
first time since 1948, a formidable third-party candidate challenged the nominees of the two major parties.  George 
C. Wallace, a former governor of Alabama, ran as the nominee of his own creation, the American Independent 
Party.  Wallace's candidacy, like Strom Thurmond's in 1948, was largely based on a platform of segregation and 
states' rights.  However, unlike Thurmond's, Wallace's appeal extended beyond the South.  Wallace supporters 
placed elector slates pledged to him on the ballots of all fifty states. [FN144]  Although Wallace had little chance of 
capturing the Presidency, his strength in the South and ability to draw votes away from the major party candidates 
presented a viable threat. 
 
  Nixon ultimately beat Humphrey by approximately 500,000 popular votes and received 301 electoral votes. 
[FN145]  Wallace's candidacy undoubtedly affected the final electoral vote outcome. He carried five states in the 
Deep South and received forty-six electoral votes. [FN146]  A total shift of 53,024 votes from Nixon to Humphrey 
in Missouri, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, would have reduced Nixon's electoral vote total to 269, one less than 
the 270 required for election. [FN147]  Wallace's candidacy would have played an even greater role had Nixon 
failed to capture an electoral *740 vote majority.  According to Wallace, he would have instructed his electors to 
cast their votes for Nixon "'because we were violently opposed to Mr. Humphrey's philosophy and ideology." ' 
[FN148]  Wallace also stated that he would have likely asked Nixon to halt enforcement of certain civil rights laws 
and busing before taking such action. [FN149] 
 
  The election of 1968 also reveals several potential problems with the Electoral College system.  First, with 
relatively minor vote shifts in three states, no candidate would have received an electoral vote majority.  Wallace's 
comments after the election show how a third-party candidate with relatively low levels of national support could 
play the role of kingmaker by shifting the votes of his electors to one candidate or another.  In 1968, such a scenario 
would have undoubtedly caused the eventual winner to make concessions to Wallace.  Furthermore, given Wallace's 
opposition to desegregation, such concessions would have likely undermined many of the civil rights advances of 
the early 1960s. This possibility would be all but extinguished under a direct election system. 
 
 
3. The Election of 1976 
 
  Virtually unknown nationally at the beginning of the 1976 campaign, Jimmy Carter, the former governor of 
Georgia, emerged from a crowded Democratic field to take on incumbent President Gerald R. Ford.  Carter began 
 the fall campaign with a sizable lead, but found himself in a dead heat with Ford by the beginning of October. 
[FN150]  As the race tightened, both campaigns focused significant attention and resources on the nine largest 
electoral states, which together held 245 of the 270 electoral votes needed for victory. [FN151]  In the end, Carter 
claimed a popular vote victory of nearly 1.7 million votes, or 2.1% of the votes cast. [FN152]  Carter captured 297 
electoral votes, compared to 240 for Ford. [FN153]  In California, Ford received all of the state's forty-five *741 
electoral votes despite a razor-thin edge in the popular vote. [FN154]  Likewise, Carter gained New York's forty-one 
electoral votes with a similarly small popular vote margin. [FN155] 
 
  With slight popular vote shifts in two states, Ford would have garnered a majority of electoral votes despite losing 
the nationwide popular vote by more than two percent.  In Ohio, Carter defeated Ford by only 11,116 votes out of 
more than four million cast. [FN156]  Therefore, a shift of 5,560 votes from Carter to Ford in Ohio would have 
given the state's twenty- five electoral votes to Ford, reducing Carter's electoral vote total to 272. In addition, a shift 
of 3,687 votes in Hawaii from Carter to Ford would have given Ford the state's four electoral votes. [FN157]  Had 
Ford overcome Carter's slim margins and prevailed in Ohio and Hawaii, he would have won the 1976 election with 
270 electoral votes despite losing the nationwide popular vote by more than 1.7 million votes. [FN158]  Further, 
even if Ford had gained the necessary 5,560 votes to win Ohio, Carter would have had only 272 electoral votes, only 
two greater than the 270 needed for victory.  In such a close election, "two or three individual Democratic electors 
seeking personal recognition or attention to a pet cause could withhold their electoral votes and thus make the 
election outcome very uncertain." [FN159] 
 
  Like the 1960 election, the election of 1976 demonstrated the potential relationship between fraud and the Electoral 
College system.  Allegations of voting irregularities began to surface in New York, whose forty-one electoral votes 
were more than enough to elect Ford. [FN160]  Although Carter eventually prevailed in New York by287,767 votes, 
Republicans sounded calls for a recount *742 on election night. [FN161]  Ford approved an initial effort to secure 
New York voting booths, but later abandoned any recount hopes as Carter's sizable lead in the national popular vote 
grew. [FN162]  Despite allegations of fraud and other irregularities, Ford also refused to contest election returns in 
Ohio and Wisconsin. [FN163]  The fraud allegations in New York are especially significant because, if true, Carter's 
margin of 287,767 votes in New York decided the election.  In contrast, under a direct popular election system, the 
outcome would have only been affected if irregularities plagued more than 1.7 million votes, the size of Carter's 
national popular vote plurality.  Further, Ford's credibility and effectiveness would have certainly been compromised 
had he retained the Presidency despite losing the popular vote by such a large margin. 
 
 
B. Federalism Concerns 
 
  Supporters of the Electoral College also maintain that the system preserves the concept of federalism that was so 
important to the framers.  Opponents of direct election claim that presidential candidates would focus on states like 
California, New York, and Texas at the expense of less populous states.  They maintain that the Electoral College 
requires candidates to campaign in nearly every state and address regional issues. [FN164] 
 
  This notion that small states would suffer neglect under a direct election plan lacks merit.  Common sense dictates 
that presidential candidates will expend limited amounts of time and effort in states that are dominated by either 
Republicans or Democrats.  For example, neither Bush nor Gore visited Idaho during the 2000 general campaign, an 
overwhelmingly Republican state with only four electoral votes. [FN165]  In similar fashion, Bush made one brief 
campaign stop in the Republican stronghold of Utah, while Gore bypassed the state entirely. [FN166]  Even small 
swing states received little attention in 2000.  In Nevada, a poll taken one week *743 before the election showed that 
Bush's lead over Gore was within the poll's margin of error. [FN167] But during the campaign, Bush visited Nevada 
only once, and Gore stopped in Las Vegas twice. [FN168]  These data suggest that direct election would actually 
encourage presidential candidates to visit states where the popular vote outcome is a foregone conclusion.  If every 
vote for President receives the same weight, candidates would campaign wherever additional votes might be 
obtained.  Under a direct election system, states like Idaho and Utah would actually see more of the presidential 
candidates than under the Electoral College system. 
 
 
C. Nationwide Recount 
 
   Critics also maintain that the direct vote alternative is fraught with administrative difficulties.  One such difficulty 
is the potential for a nationwide recount in a close popular vote contest. [FN169]  The election of 1960 provided 
such a scenario.  Obtaining a nationwide popular vote figure would have been nearly impossible given Alabama's 
eccentric method of counting popular votes and the fraud allegations present in other states.  With direct election, 
the nation would have undoubtedly been subject to numerous recounts and legal battles to determine the 1960 
popular vote winner. 
 
  With technological advances and the possibility of congressional funding for a national voting system, conducting 
an efficient and timely nationwide recount is far from an impossible task today.  Individual states are also currently 
taking steps to modernize obsolete voting systems.  For example, Florida legislators recently approved a bill that 
eliminates punch-card voting machines and provides new uniform standards for vote recounts. [FN170]  Such 
improvements will certainly make future recounts *744 faster and more accurate.  Furthermore, state election 
officials are able to complete statewide recounts in a sufficiently expeditious manner.  The 2000 U.S. Senate race in 
Washington state between Slade Gorton and Maria Cantwell illustrates this point.  Washington, like Florida, 
requires a statewide recount when a candidate's margin of victory is less than one-half of one percent. [FN171] 
Washington officials completed the mandatory recount in twenty-four days, eleven days less than the time needed to 
resolve the Florida vote controversy. [FN172]  The Gorton-Cantwell recount was also prolonged by the fact that 
Washington absentee ballots need only be postmarked by election day to be valid. [FN173]  Assuming that Congress 
followed most states and required a national recount only when one percentage point or less separated the top two 
presidential candidates, the 1960, 1968, and 2000 elections would have been subject to recounts. [FN174] 
 
 
D. Other Criticisms 
 
  Other critics suggest that utilization of a direct vote plan will encourage multiple candidates and fail to guarantee 
victory to the candidate with the most support in a multi-candidate presidential race. [FN175]  For instance, in a 
crowded field, a candidate with far less than a majority of the popular vote might become President.  One way to 
alleviate this problem is to utilize a runoff election when no candidate receives a suitable percentage of the popular 
vote.  In 1992, Bill Clinton won the election with only forty-three percent of the popular vote. [FN176]  Similarly, 
both George W. Bush and Al Gore failed to win a majority of the *745 popular vote in 2000.  Given these 
percentages, a minimum popular vote threshold, such as the Durbin-LaHood forty percent requirement, should 
satisfy any concerns about a candidate becoming President with substantially less than a popular vote majority. 
 
 
E. Flaws of the Winner-Take-All System 
 
  Turning to the weaknesses of the current system, the Electoral College's principal flaw stems from the winner-take-
all systems operative in most states. [FN177]  Under the winner-take-all system, whichever candidate obtains the 
highest popular vote total in a state, regardless of his margin of victory, obtains all of the state's electoral votes.  For 
example, despite his minuscule margin of victory in Florida, George W. Bush obtained all twenty-five of Florida's 
electoral votes, nearly one-tenth of the total needed for victory. 
 
  The winner-take-all system allows larger states, like California, New York, and Texas, to disproportionately affect 
the outcome of presidential elections. California's current number of electoral votes provides approximately twenty 
percent of the total required to obtain a majority in the Electoral College. Consequently, a vote for President in Los 
Angeles is, at least strategically, far more valuable than one in a more sparsely populated locale.  For instance, a 
statistical study based on the 1990 census found that the Electoral College gave a voter in California 2.663 times the 
ability of a Montana voter to decide a presidential election. [FN178]  The same study concluded that the Electoral 
College system resulted in disproportionate voting power for the nine most populous states. [FN179]  John F. 
Banzhaf's oft-cited analysis *746 of state voting power in the Electoral College reached a similar conclusion:  
    The existing Electoral College system discriminates against voters in the small and middle-sized states by giving 
citizens of the large states an excessive amount of voting power.  Citizens of states like New York and California 
have over two and one-half times as much chance to affect the election of the President as residents of some of the 
smaller states and over three times as much chance as citizens of the District of Columbia. Disparities in voting 
power of over 200% have been demonstrated and disparities of over 100% are not uncommon.  Citizens of 32 states 
and the District of Columbia have less than average voting power. [FN180] 
  
  Thus, the Electoral College undermines the important political value that every citizen should have an equal voice 
in deciding who assumes the Presidency. 
 
  Only a direct election system gives individual votes equal weight.  In Gray v. Sanders, [FN181] the Supreme Court 
stated: "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, 
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing--one person, one vote." 
[FN182]  Gray involved a challenge to Georgia's indirect primary system, where candidates for statewide offices 
were elected by county unit vote rather than direct popular vote. Georgia attempted to analogize its unit voting 
system to the Electoral College, but the Court dismissed the analogy as "inapposite" and struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional. [FN183]  The Court's only justification for this conclusion was that the text of the Constitution 
explicitly provides for the Electoral College.  Reconciling the Court's holding in Gray, which required an equal 
dispersal of votes among a candidate's constituency, with the winner- take-all system of the Electoral College is 
difficult at best.  Unless mere mention of the Electoral College in the text of the Constitution "exempts all of its 
various nontextual facets from scrutiny, the Court too quickly dismissed Georgia's *747 analogy." [FN184] 
 
  The disparity in state voting power that results from the Electoral College significantly enhances the possibility that 
a single state will determine the outcome of an election, regardless of the reliability of its vote results or the methods 
used to select presidential electors.  To witness this effect, one need go no farther than the 2000 presidential election 
between Bush and Gore. Despite the controversies surrounding inconsistent vote-counting standards, antiquated 
equipment, and confusing ballots, the results in Florida effectively decided the 2000 presidential election.  Only 
direct election of the President, with each person having one vote, remedies these unequal effects of the winner- 
take-all system. 
 
 
F. Role of Electors 
 
  Another factor supporting direct election of the President is that the role of the presidential elector has changed 
substantially since 1787.  The Constitution's only restriction on the eligibility of electors is that "no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an 
Elector." [FN185]  By entrusting the selection of electors to the state legislatures, the framers undoubtedly believed 
that, the "wise men of the community" would select the President. [FN186]  As early as 1826, however, a Senate 
committee noted that electors were "'usually selected for their devotion to party, their popular manners, and a 
supposed talent for electioneering." ' [FN187]  Today, the criteria for selecting presidential electors have changed 
dramatically.  The most common traits shared by current electors are service to and financial support of a political 
party. [FN188]  Longley describes today's electors as "little more than a motley state-by-state collection of political 
hacks and fat cats usually selected because of their past loyalty and support for *748 their party." [FN189]  Noted 
author James Michener, a Pennsylvania presidential elector in 1968, agreed with Longley's assessment:  
    In my case I was chosen to be an elector because I had worked hard for my party.  I was passed upon by no public 
hearing, no primary vote, no board of qualifications, no review of my prior public service.  My finest credentials 
were that each year I contributed what money I could to the party. [FN190] 
 
  The notion that the nation somehow relies on the special knowledge and expertise of presidential electors in 
choosing a President is weak at best. 
 
  Further, although electors are not bound by the Constitution to vote for a particular candidate, the reality is that 
electors rarely exercise discretion and almost always vote for their party's nominee. [FN191]  Between 1796 and 
1988, only nine presidential electors voted for a candidate not supported by their party, and no faithless elector has 
ever changed the outcome of a presidential election. [FN192]  Nevertheless, the danger remains that in a close 
election, an elector seeking publicity for a particular cause or personal notoriety might switch or withhold his or her 
vote, causing a popular vote winner to lose or throwing the election into the House of Representatives. 
 
  Moreover, due to the limited means of communication present *749 at the time of the founding, the framers 
believed that citizens would have limited access to information about candidates from other states.  Because the top 
two vote-getters became President and Vice President, the obvious solution to this problem was to require a voter to 
vote for two different candidates from different states.  This proposition presented the framers with a dilemma.  An 
 individual would undoubtedly have the necessary information about a candidate from his state, but how could a 
voter in Georgia learn about a presidential candidate from New York in 1787? [FN193]  The establishment of the 
Electoral College was undoubtedly, at least in part, an effort to address this problem. A small number of electors, 
prominent in government and chosen by the state legislatures, were much more likely to be familiar with the various 
presidential candidates than the average citizen.  The delegates alleviated their fear that electors would blindly 
support home-state candidates by requiring electors to vote for at least one candidate who was not an inhabitant of 
their state. 
 
  America is today, of course, a markedly different nation than it was in 1787.  National broadcast and print media 
provide extensive coverage of presidential campaigns from start to finish.  From the moment a presidential candidate 
declares his candidacy, his every move, speech, or comment is transmitted to all fifty states and around the world by 
newspapers and television.  The television networks beam presidential debates into millions of homes nationwide.  
Americans certainly do not lack information about a candidate's views, positions, or personal life.  Particular 
mediums, such as the cable network C-SPAN, provide continuous programming exclusively related to government 
and politics, including substantial coverage of presidential elections.  Current voting trends also suggest that 
residents of a particular state are unlikely to vote for a candidate solely because he or she is a resident of the voter's 
home state.  Indeed, Al Gore did not carry his home state of Tennessee in 2000, and, ironically, his failure to capture 
the state's eleven electoral votes cost him the election. [FN194] 
 
 
*750 G. Election by the House of Representatives 
 
  Under the Electoral College system, the potential for deadlock exists when no candidate receives a majority of 
electoral votes.  As noted previously, the House of Representatives then elects the President in accordance with the 
Twelfth Amendment.  If no person qualifies for the office of President on inauguration day, then the Vice President-
elect, assuming he or she qualifies, assumes the role of acting President. [FN195]  When the House is unable to elect 
a President under the Twelfth Amendment procedure, the Senate is also likely to encounter similar difficulty in 
selecting a Vice President.  The potential for deadlock is exacerbated when both parties control similar numbers of 
seats in either house of Congress, which is currently the case.  If no vice presidential candidate receives a majority 
of electoral votes, the likelihood of a closely divided Senate giving a majority vote to any one candidate is very slim.  
Congress recognized this possibility when it enacted the Automatic Succession Act of 1947, which provides the 
order of succession to the Presidency if no person qualifies for either office. [FN196] 
 
 
H. Third-Party Presidential Candidates 
 
  In contrast to the current domination of the presidential electoral process by the two major political parties, the 
framers envisioned presidential elections with numerous candidates.  They believed that because an elector would 
favor a presidential candidate *751 from his own state, a single candidate would rarely obtain a majority of the 
electoral votes cast. Consequently, the framers expected the House of Representatives to decide most elections.  
Only twice, however, in 1800 and 1824, has a presidential election been thrown into the House.  In fact, the only 
recent election where resort to the House contingent procedure was even a remote possibility occurred in 1968, 
when George Wallace's candidacy threatened to deprive the major party candidates of an electoral vote majority. 
[FN197] 
 
  But the possibility of a third-party candidate receiving enough electoral votes to throw an election to the House of 
Representatives today is remote. Despite the recent independent candidacies of Ralph Nader, Ross Perot, and Pat 
Buchanan, the two major parties have a virtual lock on the presidential election process. [FN198]  One substantial 
factor in this domination is the federal matching campaign funds program, enacted by Congress in 1974 in response 
to President Nixon's perceived fundraising abuses in the 1972 campaign. [FN199]  To qualify for matching funds 
during the presidential primary, a candidate must raise a minimum of $5,000 in each of twenty states, and the 
contributions must also be of *752 $250 or less and from individual donors. [FN200]  Candidates who accept 
matching funds are subject to a spending limit during the primary election. [FN201]  The advantage to the two major 
parties is even greater in the general election, where a party that obtains twenty-five percent or greater of the popular 
vote in the previous presidential election is considered a "major party" and qualifies for substantial federal matching 
funds. [FN202]  Minor parties qualify for a smaller amount if they garner more than five percent of the popular vote 
 in the previous election. [FN203] 
 
  In light of the two major parties' enormous edge in fundraising, the current system strongly favors Republicans and 
Democrats.  Matching funds provided by the government only enhance the financial gulf between the major parties 
and smaller parties.  In addition to enormous amounts of money, parties seeking matching funds must also have a 
widespread, national organization.  The requirements needed to obtain matching funds are a likely reason why no 
third- party candidate after the advent of federal matching funds has come even remotely close to depriving a 
candidate of an electoral vote majority. 
 
  As a result of Perot's performance in the 1996 election, the Reform Party qualified for federal matching funds in 
2000.  Perot's relative success in 1992 and 1996 was in large part self-financed: he contributed millions to both 
campaigns and limited outside contributions to very small amounts. [FN204] Further, Perot provided the bulk of the 
resources necessary for the Reform Party to build an organization large and widespread enough to qualify for 
matching funds.  In short, to obtain federal funds for a presidential campaign, a candidate must be the nominee of a 
major party or be independently wealthy. 
 
  Under the current system, the possibility of the House deciding *753 an election between multiple presidential 
candidates is highly unlikely. Consequently, the federal matching funds system, in conjunction with the Electoral 
College, perpetuates the domination of presidential elections by the two major parties.  This notion alleviates, to 
some extent, concerns that direct election of the President by popular vote will encourage splinter candidacies and 
promote faction. 
 
 
VII 
 
Legitimacy 
 
  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, losing the popular vote seriously threatens a President's legitimacy.  
Allowing a President to win office despite losing the popular vote is contrary to America's time-honored principles 
of majoritarian democracy.  Akhil Amar predicted in 1995 that "[o]ne day, we will end up with a clear Loser 
President--clear beyond any quibbles about uncertain ballots.  And the question is, will this Loser/Winner be seen as 
legitimate at home and abroad?" [FN205]  Others agree with Amar's assessment.  Instances where a popular vote 
loser prevails in the Electoral College are "fraught with danger.  The legitimacy and governability of a president 
without a popular vote majority is prima facie suspect.  A system that does not include direct expression of the voice 
of the people undermines the principle of a government with the consent of the governed." [FN206]  Electing a 
President who loses the popular vote "undermines respect for the system and compromises the new president's 
mandate to govern." [FN207] 
 
  Indeed, following the Supreme Court decision that effectively handed George W. Bush the 2000 presidential 
election, questions immediately arose regarding Bush's legitimacy as President. [FN208]  Although time will tell 
just how Bush's precarious electoral vote victory affects his ability to govern, history provides some guide.  *754 
Prior to 2000, three candidates obtained the Presidency despite losing the popular vote: Adams in 1824, Hayes in 
1876, and Harrison in 1888.  The administrations of these three Presidents were largely unsuccessful.  In 1828, 
Andrew Jackson avenged his prior loss and soundly defeated Adams in both the Electoral College and popular vote. 
[FN209]  By the end of his term, Hayes was so unpopular among members of his own party that he declined to run 
for reelection. [FN210]  Like Jackson before him, Grover Cleveland returned to deny Harrison a second term in 
1892. [FN211] 
 
  Gerald Ford faced similar problems after assuming the Presidency in 1974.  Earlier, Congress confirmed Ford as 
Nixon's Vice President following the resignation of Nixon's first Vice President, Spiro Agnew. [FN212]  Following 
Nixon's resignation in August 1974, Ford faced the daunting prospect of governing a nation that had neither elected 
him to the Presidency nor the Vice Presidency.  Without the popular mandate a President gains by virtue of winning 
an election, Ford found little support in Congress for his legislative proposals.  In slightly more than two years in 
office, he vetoed a remarkable sixty-six bills. [FN213]  Although Ford's circumstances are somewhat different from 
those of a popular vote loser who obtains the Presidency, they demonstrate the difficulties faced by a President who 
is viewed, at least by some, as lacking a popular mandate.  The bottom line is that the Electoral College system has 
 the potential to create a significant crisis with respect to the legitimacy and effectiveness of a President.  
Implementation of a direct popular vote system in presidential elections is the only way to fully address this concern. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  For more than 200 years, the United States has relied on the Electoral College to select its Presidents.  Under this 
system, four Presidents have assumed office despite losing the popular vote.  *755 On several other occasions, 
including the elections of 1960, 1968, and 1976, minor vote shifts in key states would have turned popular vote 
losers into Presidents.  These results are contrary to the essence of democracy.  Furthermore, as the election of 2000 
demonstrated, the Electoral College can create tremendous uncertainty in presidential elections.  This uncertainty 
threatens the legitimacy of the office of the President at home and abroad. 
 
  Beyond these concerns, the Electoral College's unit voting method, where some votes receive more weight than 
others, is simply unfair.  Even Alexander M. Bickel, an ardent proponent of the Electoral College, conceded that the 
current system "was unquestionably intended to serve ends we no longer care to serve, and which it no longer 
serves.  Only in form does it remain what it was invented to be." [FN214]  Yet Electoral College supporters continue 
to assert that it advances the federalism principles that were so important to the framers.  On several occasions, 
however, the nation has seen fit to alter the Constitution when it disagreed with the framers' skeptical views toward 
popular democracy.  The Reconstruction era amendments to the Constitution discarded the framers' views on white 
supremacy.  Similarly, the Seventeenth Amendment took the power to elect United States senators away from state 
legislatures and provided for direct election of senators by the people.  The Nineteenth Amendment gave American 
women the right to vote, despite the framers' specific prohibitions on women's suffrage.  Likewise, regardless of 
which state he or she calls home, each voter should have an equal voice in selecting our nation's President.  
Throughout the United States, voters choose governors, senators, and mayors by direct popular election.  The result 
is simple: the candidate who receives the most votes wins.  We should elect the President in similar democratic 
fashion.  The time has come for the Electoral College to go. 
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